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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ALFRED D. PEHRSON and
RHEA B. PEHRSON ,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Vs.
BOYD C. SADERUP, MADELINE
SADERUP and BRUCE
SADERUP,

Case No.
12723

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs against defendants
for damages arising from the wrongful cutting of lilac
trees on the property of the plaintiffs. The trial court
found in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, but found that plaintiffs were entitled only
to nominal damages in the sum of $50.00, which damages were trebled under the provisions of Section 7838-3, Utah Code Annotated, making a total judgrnent for plaintiffs in the sum of $150.00.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek an order remanding the
case to the trial court directing the trial court to enter a
judgment for the plaintiff based upon a proper measure of damages.
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and defendant, Boyd C. Saderup, each
owned adjoining properties situated between Sixth and
Seventh North Streets and University Avenue and First
Streets in Provo, Utah. Plaintiffs' property
fronted on University Avenue and defendant, Boyd C.
Saderup's, property fronted on First West Street. At
the time the plaintiffs purchased their property in 1965,
the back yard of the plaintiffs' property was well and
gracefully landscaped and there were growing at the
rear or westerly most part of the plaintiffs' property
French hybrid lilacs. The lilac trees were approximately
fifteen feet in height (T-12) and provided a complete
screen to the rear of plaintiffs' property. Even after
the defendant, Boyd C. Saderup, constructed apartments on his property, the lilac trees were, and acted as,
a complete screen between the properties and afforded
complete privacy to the plaintiffs ( '1'-13) . Not only
did the lilacs provide a screen, but they provided beauty
to the plaintiffs ( T-13). The lilacs were 35 to 36 years
old (T-17). On July 4, 1970, the plaintiffs discovered
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their lilacs had been cut off at the ground with a saw
(T-14) (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). Sixteen clumps of the
85 year old lilacs were cut by the defendant, Bruce
Saderup, acting as agent of Boyd C. Saderup (T-18).
Bruce Saderup, acting as agent of Boyd C. Saderup,
:idmitted cutitng the lilacs without any verification as
to the property line or without consulting the deed to
look at the description on the deed, or without having a
survey (T-51). The plaintiff, Alfred D. Pehrson,
stated that in his opinion the lilac trees had a value of
$2,000.00 to $2,500.00 (T-18).
Paul Quist of Forest Hills Nursery of Salt Lake
City, was called as an expert in the ornamental line of
horticulture, which is the placement of trees and shrubs
in the landscape ..Mr. Quist testified the lilacs were
French hybrids, that there would be suckering from the
roots and that the trees would eventually replace themselves, but they would be the common lilac or root stock
sapling and it would take twenty-five years or more to
replace themselves (T-31) ..Mr. Quist further testified
that each lilac clump would cost, excluding the labor of
digging and replanting, between $75.00 and $100.00
apiece (T-31). l\Ir. ·Quist further testified that it would
cost $50.00 each per clump to prepare the soil and plant
the tree (T-31).
Prior to the trial, the trial court indicated the case
'rnuld be tried on the theory of Brereton v. Dixon, 20
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Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3. Upon the conclusion of the
case the court took the matter under advisement and
subsequently ruled that Brereton v. Dixon applied only
to economically productive fruit trees and the trial court
was not inclined to expand the rule of that case further.
The court further stated that the measure of damages
is the difference between fair and reasonable market
value of the property as a whole, including improvements, immediately before and immediately after the
IIlJUry.

The action was brought through the provisions of
78-38-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for treble damages. The evidence presented would sustain a judgment
of actual damages of from $2,000.00 to $2,400.00, which
judgment should then be trebled.
After the ruling of the trial court the plaintiffs
made a motion for a new trial, a motion to make additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
a motion to reopen to present further evidence ( T-31),
and upon denial of the motions (TR-33) plaintiffs appeal.
STATE1\1ENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION
OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN AN
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ACTION BROUGHT UNDER 78-38-3 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION
OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN AN
ACTION BROUGHT UNDER 78-38-3 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED.
This action was brought under the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated 78-38-3, which is quoted in full
as follows:
"78-38-3. Right of action for injuries to
trees - Damage. - Any person who cuts
down or carries off any wood or underwood,
tree or timber, or girdles or otherwise injures
any tree of timber on the land of another person, or on the street or highway in front of any
person's house, town or city lot, or cultivated
grounds, or on the commons or public grounds
of any city or town, or on the street or highway in front thereof, without lawful authority, is liable to the owner of such land, or to
such city or town, for treble the amount of
damages which may be assessed therefor in a
civil action.
It is hereby pointed out that though there may be
some question whether these lilacs were bushes or trees,
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in any event the foregoing statute applies to "any ,vood
or underwood, tree or timber." It is clear from the evidence and from Exhibit 4 that in any event the lilacs
were wood or underwood, since they were up to four
inches in diameter. Also, .l\Ir. Quist testified that they
could well be classified as a tree ( T-40) .
Although this court decided the Brereton v. Dixon
case (supra), by a divided court, nevertheless it appears
to be the law in the State of Utah and should apply
with more force in the present case, which was an intentional act rather than in the Brereton case, which was a
negligent act.
The facts of the Brereton case were that the defendant negligently permitted a fire in which he was
burning rubbish in connection with a construction project to escape and destroy the usefulness of Ill peach
and pear trees. The plaintiff prevailed and the defendant appealed claiming excessive damage and based upon
improper evidence and instructions to the jury. The defendant urged that inasmuch as the fruit trees were
part of the realty, the only proper measure of damage
would be the difference in the value of the land before
and after the destruction of the trees. The majority
stated in the Brereton case as follows:
"\,Ve are aware that in appropriate circumstances this method of assessing damages has
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been approved in numerous cases. But we do
not agree that it should be the sole and exclusive
method of assessing such damages in all circumstances. When property has been damaged
or destroyed by a wrongful act, the desired
objective is to ascertain as accurately as possible the amount of money that will fairly and
adequately compensate the owner for his loss.
Reflection will reveal that a rigid adherence
in all cases to the rule of the value of the realty
before and after the injury would not always
serve that objective. In some situations destruction or removal of part of the property
might actually enhance the value of the remaining property by conditioning it for some other
use; for example, for residential or industrial
purposes not desired by the owner. In such a
case application of the rule of value of the
realty before and after the injury would penalize the owner by giving him less than his true
damage and confer an unjustified advantage
on the wrongdoer by permitting him to pay
less than the actual damage he caused. In addition to the foregoing, there are other, sometimes far greater, difficulties encountered in
appraising the before and after value of extensive and varied tracts of land than in determining the value of a comparatively small damage
which can be separately ascertained.
In order to obviate the inequity and the difficulties just discussed, and to get more simply

and directly at the valuation of the specific
damage caused, in proper cases the courts have
applied another rule: if that which is destroyed, even though part of the realty, has a
value which can be ascertained separate from
the land, recovery is allowed for the value of
the thing destroyed or damaged, rather than
for the difference in the value of the land before and after the injury. The significant
point here is that this latter rule has heretofore
been a pp roved by this court."
This court adopted a rule in the Brereton case as
follows:
"Because of the fact that any attempt at unvarying uniformity in a pp lying either of the
foregoing rules results in the inequities above
discussed, a third rule, which we believe to be
the better considered and more practical one,
has been applied. It gives the injured party the
benefit of whichever of the two rules will
best serve the objective hereinabove stated of
giving him reasonable and adequate compensation for his actual loss as related to his use of
his property. This more flexible approach
avoids a rigid application of either rule where
it would result in conferring a favor on the
wrongdoer at the expense of the victim; and
it allows the owner of property which has been
damaged the privilege which should be his of
having the decision as to how he desires to use
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his property, by giving him the amount of
damage he suffers on the basis of that use. If
he wants to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood
lot, or even a primitive area, though his property may be of more value if turned to an industrial or residential purpose, that should be
his prerogative; and if it is wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the wrongdoer should pay
for the actual damage he caused."
This Court cited, in the Brereton case, the old Utah
case of Cleary v. Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 P. 453. The
Cleary case was an action brought by the landowner to
recover damages for tresspass on plaintiff's land by
defendant's sheep. The damage was to growing annual
crops as well as to the hay crop, which is a perennial.
The court, in the Cleary case, stated as follows:
"If the thing destroyed, although it is a part
of the realty, has a value which can be measured
and ascertained without reference to the value
of the soil in which it stands, or out of which
it grows, the recovery must be for the value
of the thing destroyed, and not for the difference in the value of the land before and
after such destruction."
The Court went on to state:
"And where grass or meadow has been eaten,
injured or destroyed, its value for hay or grazing purposes may be shown, and, if the roots
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have been destroyed, the cost of reseeding
and restoring the field or meadow, and the
value of the loss of hay or pasture sustained in
the meantime."
There have been many cases that have used the
cost of restoration as the measure of damages. These
cases are collected at 69 ALR 2d 1370 and in 69 ALR
Supplemental Service Page 418 and in the pocket part,
Page llO. The New Jersey Court, in the case of Huber
v. Serpico, 71 N.J. Super 329, 179 Atlanta 2d 805, held
that an aggrieved landowner should be allowed fair cost
of restoring his land to reasonable approximattion of
its former condition without necessary limitation to
diminution in market value of land where a trespasser
has destroyed shade or ornamental trees or shrubbery
having peculiar value to the owner. This rule has been
followed in many jurisdictions, including l\1aryland,
Ohio, 'Vashington, and others.
In the vast majority of the cases an action brought
under Utah Code Annotated 78-38-3 would fail under
the rule set forth by the trial court, since the statute
applies to trees or wood on a person's house, town or
city lot, on cultivated grounds, or on the commons or
public grounds of any city or town, or on a street or
highway in front thereof. It is readily apparent that a
street would have the same value as a street, with or
without trees, that cultivated ground would produce the
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same amount of crop, with or without trees, and by applying the trial court's rule, an intentional wrongdoer
would, at best, be responsible only for nominal damages.
It is clear and uncontradicted that the value, based
upon Paul Quist, the expert, of each lilac clump is
$7 J.00 to $100.00, together with $50.00 for planting.
It is clear that the actual damages proven for the 16
clumps are at least $2,000.00 and at most $2,400.00.
The damages being incurred by reason of a wilful trespass and, as provided in Utah Code Annotated 78-38-3,
those actual damages should be trebled.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred in its application of the measure of
damages in this case. This Court could properly direct
the entry of a judgment using the proper measure> of
damages in an amount of $2,000.00 to $2,400.00, which
amount should then be trebled pursuant to the statute
or this court should remand the case to the trial court
for the entry of judgment based upon the proper measure of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD AND LE\VIS
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

